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INTRODUCTION

ROGER L. GOLDMAN*
On February 24, 2012, Saint Louis University School of Law and the Saint
Louis University Public Law Review presented a symposium titled; “Control of
Police Misconduct in a Post-Exclusionary Rule World: Can it Be Done?” In
recent cases like Hudson v. Michigan,1 four members of the United States
Supreme Court argued that excluding reliable evidence, which could result in
letting guilty defendants go free, may have been necessary in 1961 when the
Court imposed the exclusionary rule on the states in Mapp v. Ohio,2 but times
have changed. Other remedies were now effective in controlling police
behavior, such as better training of police, civilian review boards, and civil
suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Symposium brought together leading
academics from a variety of disciplines and practitioners from the public and
private sectors to discuss whether the three remedies mentioned in Hudson as
well as other remedies are, in fact, effective in controlling police behavior.
In her article, Stakeholder Participation in the Selection and Recruitment
of Police: Democracy in Action, Professor Kami Chavis Simmons argues that
the community-policing model, involving partnership between all segments of
the community and the police who serve that community, would support
citizen involvement in both the recruitment and selection of police officers.
The vehicle for accomplishing this goal should be pattern and practice suits
brought by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
Consent decrees entered into pursuant to Section 14141 currently stress the
importance of community policing concepts in areas other than recruitment
and hiring. And the DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) has issued reports recognizing the value of citizen involvement in
recruitment and hiring. The Author notes the existence of such efforts in
various communities, including Sacramento and Detroit. She recommends that
any consent decrees that include citizen involvement in recruitment and hiring
should be monitored to make sure it does not lead to corruption; that all
segments of the community are at the table, including those who are its most
vulnerable members; and that there is an evaluation component to determine if
the community benefited from the process.

* Callis Family Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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With respect to the four federal remedies designed to deter police from
constitutional violations—the exclusionary rule, civil suits under Section 1983,
criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and pattern and
practice suits under 42 U.S.C. § 14141—Professor Rachel Harmon argues that
these remedies “are almost as good as they are ever going to get.” Her article,
Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, describes in detail
that any improvements in these remedies will be only marginally more
effective in deterring misconduct. Instead of using the stick, that is, “making
misconduct unappealing relative to reform,” which is what the current
remedies do, she advocates using the carrot, that is, “making reform more
appealing relative to misconduct.” Specifically, she suggests that the DOJ
could provide technical assistance to departments willing to undertake reform
measures and the COPS Office could give grants to departments for programs
to promote civil rights. The DOJ could also agree not to bring suits under
Section 14141 if a police department would adopt reforms. Any such efforts,
however, would have to be evaluated to make sure desired outcomes were
achieved.
In his article, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The
Problem of Making Police Reforms Endure, Professor Samuel Walker
addresses a largely ignored question: once police reforms are adopted by a
police department—particularly accountability-related reforms—do they
become embedded in the culture or are they abandoned over time? Professor
Walker discusses the failure of departments to institutionalize such reforms as
anti-corruption efforts and team policing. He notes that it is uncertain whether
community-oriented policing reforms will have more staying power, but there
are hopeful signs that problem-oriented policing efforts will be
institutionalized. With respect to accountability reform efforts, he focuses on
consent decrees pursuant to Section 14141 and notes that there has been no
systematic evaluation of the long-term benefits of the decrees. Professor
Walker also observes that there is some hope police officers will be more
receptive to accountability reform efforts than in the past because of the greater
diversity among police officers in terms of education, gender, race, and
ethnicity. What is more worrisome is resistance to change from police unions.
Further, there may be differences among departments in terms of willingness
to embrace accountability-related reforms. He focuses on one such department
that has embraced reform efforts—the Charlotte, North Carolina Police
Department—and uses it as a model for other departments. Finally, he
recommends the use of a police auditor to monitor the continuity of reforms.
In The Numbers Dilemma: The Chimera of Modern Police Accountability
Systems, Professor James F. Gilsinan questions the usefulness of recent
attempts to bring transparency and accountability to the management of police
departments. He notes six problems with these efforts to quantify criminal
activities: 1) the question of what crimes should be included in the statistics; 2)
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data can be manipulated for political reasons, e.g., kept low to encourage
tourists, kept high to get money for more officers; 3) numbers can rise or fall
easily, e.g., a crime spree might be one incident or 20 incidents; 4) context is
more important than numbers; 5) measurement can hide judgment; and 6) there
is pressure to produce good numbers. The adoption of programs like CompStat
has not brought about better policing and has caused divisions between line
officers and commanders. Various studies have shown that street officers
conform to preexisting ideas of the way things ought to be. The Author notes
the institutional pressures to act like other police departments—to imitate what
others do rather than initiate change. Finally, the focus on data has not
translated into information and knowledge, which are indispensable for real
change. Paradoxically, he concludes, as these systems of accountability take
root in an organization, the chance of true accountability and transparency is
lessened.
In his article, Police Training as an Instrument of Accountability, Professor
David A. Klinger suggests that training on how to avoid use of excessive force
must take into account four prototypical officers: 1) those who believe they are
justified in using force as they see fit; 2) those who normally wouldn’t use
unnecessary force, but would in certain situations, e.g., confronting a
particularly heinous suspect; 3) those who do not know the rules; and 4) those
who use poor tactics. Each of these prototypes must receive training tailored to
their particular needs, which is not the norm in a one-size-fits-all approach.
Professor Klinger concludes that there has not been enough empirical research
on whether police training makes a difference on performance and
recommends that given all the time and money spent on training, efforts should
be made to measure its effectiveness.
In the Hudson case, Justice Scalia assumed that civil liability under Section
1983 for Fourth Amendment violations by police is an effective deterrent
undermining the need for the exclusionary rule.3 In his article, Illegal Searches
in Chicago: The Outcomes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation, Professor Mark Iris
examined the results of Section 1983 suits filed in 2009 against Chicago police
officers alleging unconstitutional searches of the person, car, or home—a total
of 187 cases. As he notes, the City of Chicago is quite transparent in posting on
its website the amount it pays out in settlements or judgments. Of the cases
filed in 2009, 139 were disposed of by the time he wrote his article, either by
dismissal by one of the parties, settlement, or verdict. The total amount paid by
the city for federal civil rights claims, not just unconstitutional searches, for the
years 2008 to 2011 was over $125 million; an additional $80 million was paid
for police-related civil suits in state court during this period, mainly arising
from auto accidents with a police car. The author concludes that although

3. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598.
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Chicago is paying a great deal of money for police officers’ misconduct, it is
not at all clear that these payments—made by the city rather than the officer—
has a deterrent effect on the officers’ future behavior.
For many years, this Author has been advocating the adoption of state laws
that give a state agency the authority to revoke a police officer’s license for
serious misconduct in the same way states may revoke the license of members
of most other professions and occupations.4 In my contribution to this
symposium issue, A Model Decertification Law, I describe the necessary
components of a successful decertification law. Currently, forty four states
have such authority. In the absence of such a law, an officer who is terminated
from a police department for serious misconduct may seek employment at
another department in the same state, where he is likely to repeat the conduct.
First, all criminal justice officers must be subject to decertification, that is, not
just police officers and deputy sheriffs, but also correctional officers and
probation officers, among others. Second, the conduct that triggers
decertification cannot be just criminal convictions—there must be authority to
remove a license for conduct that does not result in a conviction, such as
perjury by an officer whose testimony results in a defendant’s being found
guilty. Finally, experience has shown that some police departments—usually
those that are small and underfunded—will not cooperate in reporting
decertifiable conduct to the state agency. Therefore, there must be a
combination of carrots and sticks to encourage their compliance. One reason
for optimism that decertification laws will continue to be strengthened is that,
unlike many other remedies, decertification can attract support from both the
law enforcement and the civil rights and liberties communities: the former is
interested in police professionalism, the latter in protecting citizens from
officers whose previous conduct renders them unfit to serve.
The articles published in this issue have attempted to assess the efficacy of
various approaches to dealing with police misconduct: from the earliest stages
of recruitment, hiring, and training; to on-the-job efforts of bringing about
transparency and accountability and institutionalizing these reforms; and
finally remedies such as court-supervised consent decrees, civil damages
actions for unconstitutional searches, and criminal prosecutions and license
revocation. A common thread runs through the articles—that much more
empirical work remains to be done to measure the effectiveness of these
reform initiatives. We thank all the conference presenters, especially those
presenters who also contributed to this Symposium issue, and the editors and
staff of the Public Law Review for their tireless efforts in putting on the
conference and publishing this issue.

4. See, e.g., Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to
Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45 (1987).

